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The collapse of the New Order has opened up political opportuni-
ties and space for Indonesians. Defying expectations of improvements 
in democratic quality, the democracy in Indonesia during these two 
decades of the Reformasi era has maintained its clientelist character-
istic. Vote buying has remained rampant in elections. Burhanuddin 
Muhtadi’s book eloquently discusses the dynamics of money politics, 
particularly the factors shaping its practice, extensiveness, effectiveness 
in gaining votes, and organization.
This book states that vote buying, a common form of electoral ma-
nipulation in new democracies, is also found in Indonesia. Instead of re-
ducing clientelism, the development of post-New Order democracy was 
marked by an increase in vote buying. The first question that Muhtadi 
dealt with pertains to the factors that shape the pattern of vote buying 
in Indonesia. 
Muhtadi firstly touched upon the change of the party system after 
the New Order. The party system, which previously only acknowledged 
three parties—Golkar, PDI, and PPP—has been expanded to include 
more parties. This can be seen from the formation of hundreds of par-
ties in the 1999, 2004, and 2009 elections. Unfortunately, the political 
system’s change has not been followed by parties’ political credibility 
and ideological differentiation. In other words, it has been difficult to 
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differentiate political parties based on their policy stances or platforms. 
Parties have mainly been political vehicles for politicians to run in 
elections. 
Another explanation by the author revolved around the changes 
in Indonesia’s electoral system, which has undergone three alterations 
from closed to semi-open to open list. These changes have impacts on 
the electoral strategies that legislative candidates employ to get votes. In 
a closed-list proportional system, voters could only vote for one party, 
which pushed candidates to focus on winning positions in lists within 
their respective parties. The transition to an open-list system gave voters 
the freedom to choose candidates directly and consequently urged can-
didates to adapt and shift their focus on gaining votes. Muhtadi argued 
that since the implementation of the open-list system, candidates have 
become more motivated to develop personal appeal. The main focus of 
the competition has shifted to internal-party rivalry, urging candidates 
to stand out from the rest within their own parties. Forming success 
teams (tim sukses) outside the formal party structure has been a com-
mon strategy among candidates.
The study found that for the past 15 years, there has been a decline 
in party ID. This could be seen from the weakening of voter attachment 
to parties—in 1999, 86% of voters identified themselves with a particular 
party, and in 2014, the number went down to 14.9%. The decline in 
party identification strengthens the argument that electoral competi-
tion in Indonesia is becoming more candidate-centric. In the practice 
that occurred in Indonesia and the other new democracies, legislative 
candidates ended up engaging in money politics to make themselves 
stand out against other candidates in their parties.
This book seeks to explain the implications of the changes in in-
stitutional design since 1998 that have created more opportunity for 
clientelistic strategies. More specifically, this book states that there is 
a correlation between the changes in the post-New Order electoral 
system and the changes in the form and mechanism of vote-buying 
in Indonesia. This condition could not be separated from the vulner-
able state of democratic institutions–including political parties–which 
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makes the designed electoral and political systems tend to provide in-
centives for politicians to use clientelistic strategies instead. To put it 
simply, the main argument that this book forwards is that the open-list 
proportional system during the Reformasi has increased the practice of 
money politics. 
The surveys that the study used show that Indonesia is ranked third 
in terms of frequency of money politics after Uganda and Benin. In 
the 2014 legislative elections, 25% to 33% of voters—or between 47 
to 62 million people—were offered monetary incentives in exchange 
for votes. Using the highest estimate, this means that every one out of 
three eligible voters has been exposed to money politics. This number 
is three times the number in the 2009 elections. The book also shows 
that money politics has become a new normality and is widely practiced 
in elections at both national and local levels. 
The rampant use of vote buying leads to a couple more follow-up 
questions: What are the factors that shape an individual’s likelihood of 
being exposed to money politics? How are voters targeted? This book 
explains that there are two main streams in the debate about targets of 
clientelistic practices: the core-voter and swing-voter models. The first 
model argues that parties distribute material benefits to their supporters 
or loyal voters to mobilize them to vote on election day. The latter view 
money politics as a strategy to influence undecided voters. 
Muhtadi’s surveys, administered before and after election days, 
found that party identification has been one of the factors shaping the 
decision to practice money politics. On the surface, this finding seems 
to follow the core-voter model. It is very likely that this is due to the 
significance of internal party competition caused by the open-list pro-
portional system. However, candidates cannot win by simply targeting 
partisan voters as the number of voters who identify themselves with a 
particular party is low. A national survey ahead of the 2014 elections 
found that only 15% of respondents identified themselves with a par-
ticular party. Voters who had been consistently voting for the same party 
in 2009 and 2014 were as low as 22%. Meanwhile, the percentage of 
swing voters or those who did not identify with any party reached 85%. 
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Muhtadi found that there has been a mistargeting of voters by politi-
cians and their success teams. Although candidates and their success 
teams claimed that they target partisan voters, this study found the 
contrary, suggesting a discrepancy between the candidates’ and success 
teams’ intentions and the realization.
Muhtadi argued that vote buying in Indonesia could not be ex-
plained using the core-voter nor the swing-voter model. He offered an 
alternative model called the personal loyalist model that combines the 
core-voter strategy with an emphasis on the use of the candidates’ and 
success teams’ personal networks. This is supported by findings that 
a large portion of material rewards have been received by voters who 
did not identify themselves with any particular party but are part of 
the candidates’ and their success teams’ personal clientelist networks. 
Thus, it is shown that the operation of vote buying goes beyond party 
bases because both core and swing voters were found to have received 
incentives. 
According to Muhtadi, this method of vote buying is also prone 
to fraud and malpractice. It has been found that many recipients of 
monetary incentives did not vote for the candidates who distributed 
them. This means that although candidates and their success teams 
have personal networks, they do not have the means to guarantee voters’ 
commitments to support them. In other words, the money is prone to 
corruption. Due to a lack of monitoring from candidates, some teams 
can exaggerate the number of targets in their operations so that candi-
dates allocate more resources needed to buy votes.
Although these risks exist, these clientelist practices remain popu-
lar in Indonesia. The latter part of the book answers the question of 
why candidates still invest significant resources for vote buying. How 
effective is money politics in swaying voters’ preferences? Muhtadi’s 
research found that money politics has the capability of influencing vot-
ers’ preferences up to 10%. In an open-list system, competition among 
candidates is highly competitive—so competitive that candidates only 
need to be ahead of their internal-party rivals by a small margin to win 
seats. The 2014 electoral results showed that the average victory margin 
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to beat internal-party rivals is only 1.65%. This book argues this has 
driven many candidates to buy votes.
However, this is not the only reason for vote buying. Several coun-
tries have been able to carry out highly competitive elections without 
tainting the competition with money politics. This book shows that 
there are at least two reasons why vote buying remains rampant in 
Indonesia. The first is the prisoner’s dilemma. All candidates will ben-
efit if everyone agrees not to buy votes. The prisoner’s dilemma is a 
situation when a candidate violates this agreement and chooses to buy 
votes, which would place the other candidates at a major disadvantage. 
In such a situation, candidates who do not take part in money politics 
would lose. Candidates are pushed to anticipate such a situation and 
become likely to employ vote buying tactics, despite the possibility that 
the strategy may not be efficient. The second reason is that although 
vote buying does not guarantee victory, this strategy is relatively more 
efficient than other electoral strategies. Candidates and their success 
teams see money politics as the better strategy for getting votes in com-
parison to other mobilization strategies. 
This book contributes to the academic literature on vote buying. 
Firstly, from a methodological standpoint, the research differs from pri-
or studies that have been divided along the ethnography-versus-survey 
line by employing a mixed-method. This choice was made to overcome 
the methodological challenges in analyzing patterns of money politics 
in Indonesia. Studies that strictly apply qualitative approaches tend to 
find difficulty in identifying causal mechanisms and measuring the 
intensity and breadth of clientelism within a population. On the other 
hand, purely quantitative approaches tend to lack contextualization in 
data interpretation. 
Secondly, Muhtadi’s study emphasized the importance of context in 
understanding how vote buying is practiced. Existing theories on vote 
buying—which have been based on cases where party structures are 
heavily rooted in society—are not sufficient in explaining vote buying in 
Indonesia, which is heavily shaped by changes in electoral systems, in-
tensive internal party competition, and candidates’ reliance on personal 
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networks rather than their own party structures. This study also shows 
that partisanship in the Indonesian context is not always related to party 
identification; it can also mean identification with informal networks. 
Lastly, Muhtadi excellently shows how the mainstream models of 
vote buying are insufficient to explain the practice of vote buying in 
Indonesia. To fill this gap, he offers a personal loyalist model. 
This book is recommended for academics wishing to deepen their 
study on money politics. It is also an excellent reference for policy-
makers to evaluate Indonesia’s party and electoral systems and improve 
Indonesia’s democracy. 
